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Abstract 
Eight lives down, Extreme risk and Bomb hunters all contain the personal 
accounts of British soldiers who served as bomb-disposal operators during the recent 
armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The books were not written as scholarly 
works intended for an academic audience. Serious students of contemporary armed 
conflict nevertheless would find them useful reading material. The books should be 
particularly useful to scholars with a professional interest in asymmetric warfare or 
the emerging role of improvised explosive devices in contemporary armed conflict.  
Introduction  
The three books discussed here address essentially the same subject. They 
contain personal accounts by British Army bomb-disposal operators2 about their 
efforts to counter the threat of improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) during the recent 
armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
trio complement each other. Although the 
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books are aimed at the (British) public, serious students of contemporary armed 
conflict should find them worth reading. This review explains why. 
Chris Hunter’s work  
Eight lives down is Chris Hunter’s first book and Extreme risk, his second. 
Both can be categorised as military memoirs. Eight lives down focusses on Major 
Hunter’s tour of duty with the British Army in Iraq during 2004. The subtitle of the 
book is The story of a counter-terrorist bomb-disposal operator’s tour in Iraq.3 This 
is an accurate single-line summary of the book. The author served the first half of 
his tour as an ammunition technical officer (ATO), dealing with the IEDs himself. 
He spent the second half of the tour as a weapons intelligence officer, working to 
counter the networks of bomb makers and planters. Eight lives down is more than 
merely an entertaining war story about the adventures of an ATO during the Iraqi 
conflict; the book provides a realistic picture of counter-IED (CIED) operations in 
Iraq, as painted by a participant.4 
Unlike Eight lives down, Extreme risk addresses Hunter’s military career 
as a whole. He joined the British Army in 1989 and resigned his commission in 
December 2006.5 Hunter served in a number of different operational theatres, 
including Northern Ireland, Bosnia and the Middle East. He spent most of his 17 
years in the military as an ATO. The subtitle of Extreme risk is given as A life 
fighting the bomb-makers.6 This is an accurate description of Hunter’s military 
career. As in the case of Eight lives down, one can view Extreme risk as a book 
about CIED operations. The significant difference between the two is one of scope – 
Eight lives down focusses on Hunter’s Iraq tour only, while Extreme risk deals with 
the whole of his military career. Hunter is certainly qualified to write with authority 
about IEDs and CIED operations. 
Hunter wrote both Eight lives down and Extreme risk in a narrative style 
similar to that of a thriller. The stories are gripping, tense and fast-moving, 
describing the adventures of a protagonist (one of the good guys) who routinely 
risks his life fighting the bad guys (the bomb makers and bomb planters). This style 
is typically associated with books written for the entertainment of the general public. 
There are indications that Hunter had something in mind in addition to entertaining 
his British readers, however. Each chapter of both books starts with a short, topical 
quotation. Hunter uses these quotations to comment and criticise indirectly. In this 
respect, the quotation used at the beginning of Eight lives down is especially 
significant. The source of the quotation is given as “A report on Mesopotamia”, 
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written by TE Lawrence (‘Lawrence of Arabia’) and published in the Sunday Times 
of 22 August 1920. The quotation reads:  
The people of England have been led, in Mesopotamia, into a trap 
from which it will be hard to escape with dignity and honour. They 
have been tricked into it by a steady withholding of information. The 
Baghdad communiqués are belated, insincere, incomplete. Things 
have been far worse than we have been told, our administration more 
bloody and inefficient than the public knows. It is a disgrace to our 
imperial record, and may soon be too inflamed for any ordinary cure. 
We are today not far from a disaster.7  
The similarities between the situation that TE Lawrence described in 1920 
and the one that Hunter faced in 2004 are obvious. It is evident that Hunter is 
commenting on the situation in Iraq as he experienced it. Hunter clearly intended not 
only to entertain his British readers, but also to inform them about the situation that 
he and his comrades faced in Iraq. 
Sean Rayment's work  
Sean Rayment’s Bomb hunters complements Chris Hunter’s accounts. 
Rayment was the defence correspondent of The Sunday Telegraph at the time he 
wrote the book. He has written for a number of other British newspapers as well, 
covering armed conflict in Africa, the Balkans (Bosnia) and the Middle East 
(Afghanistan and Iraq). Rayment was embedded with British troops in Afghanistan 
and Iraq on many occasions. Before entering journalism in 1991, he served for five 
years in the Parachute Regiment, ending with the rank of captain. Rayment did the 
research for Bomb hunters as an embedded journalist during several visits to 
Afghanistan between 2008 and 2010. During those visits, he not only conducted 
interviews with British ATOs, but also accompanied them on several missions.8 
Based on his experiences, Rayment writes with authority about CIED operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Given his profession, it is not surprising that Rayment wrote Bomb hunters 
in a journalistic style, clearly meant to inform rather than entertain. Rayment’s style 
nevertheless has something in common with that of Hunter. The journalist did not 
write as an uninvolved and distant observer. Instead, he reported as a close and 
involved observer – an insider rather than an outsider. As reporter, Rayment 
integrated the roles of observer and participant, relying on experience gained during 
both his military career and his career as conflict journalist. He recounts not only 
what the soldiers told him, but also what he saw for himself and what he thought 
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about it. Rayment, unlike Hunter, deliberately places his observations in a broader 
context and explicitly criticises both the military high command and the British 
government. Right at the beginning of his book, for instance, Rayment comments on 
his air transport into Afghanistan: 
Hopefully the aircraft’s engines are in better shape than the 
passenger cabin because that is well and truly knackered. If the 
TriStar was a civilian plane, I’m pretty sure it would be grounded. 
Parts of the interior are held together by a 3-inch-wide sliver 
masking tape and the toilet doors have a certain tendency to fly open 
while in use – “The in-flight entertainment” some wag commented – 
but, frankly, it’s good enough for ‘our boys’ flying off to war to fight 
for Queen and Country … It’s what happens when armed forces 
have been underfunded for decades.9 
The underfunding of British armed forces as well as the shortage of 
mission-critical equipment and personnel are constant themes throughout Rayment’s 
book. The same two themes may be found in Chris Hunter’s account as well. 
Censorship 
Readers should keep in mind that the books by Rayment and Hunter were 
subjected to military censorship. Rayment mentions that independent travel in 
Helmand Province (Afghanistan) at that time was so dangerous that a Western 
journalist simply had no alternative but to embed. Journalists were not allowed to 
embed with the British Army before signing the “Green Book”, however. Signing 
meant that the journalist accepted a contractual obligation to have his or her work 
scrutinised by Ministry of Defence (MoD) censors before publication.10 The threat 
of censorship was not an idle one, as can be attested by Toby Harnden, author of 
Dead men risen: The Welsh Guards and the real story of Britain’s war in 
Afghanistan. The entire first print run (24 000 copies) of that book was pulped as a 
result of security issues emerging after the official MoD review process had been 
completed.11 
Utility to scholars 
At this point in the review, it should be clear that Eight lives down, 
Extreme risk and Bomb hunters were not written as scholarly works intended for an 
academic audience. Scholars with a professional interest in contemporary armed 
conflict nevertheless should find the books useful. At least two reasons can be 
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offered in this regard. The first reason concerns the utility of personal accounts to 
scholars and researchers. Collecting information about armed conflict by reading the 
personal accounts of participants is a valid modus operandi for literature-based 
research. The books all contain the personal accounts of British soldiers who served 
as bomb-disposal operators during the recent armed conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The value of these personal accounts lies in the fact that they provide 
access to observations made by people who actually participated in CIED 
operations. The second reason concerns the fact that the books provide useful 
information on a number of subjects important to scholars who take a professional 
interest in contemporary armed conflict. Such scholars enjoy a certain advantage 
(compared to the casual reader) when it comes to interpreting the personal accounts 
in Eight lives down, Extreme risk and Bomb hunters. Scholars’ academic 
background should enable them to fit the personal accounts easily into a larger 
(theoretical) frame of reference. The three books should be particularly useful to 
military theorists and academics who take a professional interest in (i) asymmetric 
warfare and (ii) the emerging role of IEDs in contemporary armed conflict.12 
The personal accounts of Hunter and other bomb-disposal operators are 
most illuminating when considered in the context of asymmetric warfare. In this 
context, for instance, references to personnel and equipment shortages, to combat 
tours being too long and to the relentless pressure of a high rate of operations, 
acquire additional significance. These references can be seen as indications of strain 
as the British government and its military struggled to meet the demands of an 
armed conflict characterised by great asymmetry. Both Hunter and Rayment blame 
the shortage of critical personnel (especially ATOs) and equipment on years of 
underfunding and neglect. The shortage of specifically ATOs can be linked directly 
to a breakdown in recruitment caused by cuts in defence spending during the years 
preceding the Afghan and Iraqi conflicts.13 
The great disparity between the bomb hunters and the bomb 
makers/planters illustrates well the asymmetric nature of the Afghan and Iraqi 
conflicts. The magnitude of that disparity can be seen clearly when one considers 
relative costs and relative training requirements. The IEDs used in Iraq and 
Afghanistan were inexpensive weapons, costing about $30 per unit in 2011.14 This 
contrasts sharply with the cost of IED countermeasures. Between 2003 and 2011, the 
United States, for instance, had spent about $17 billion on anti-IED equipment and 
$45 billion on mine-resistant vehicles.15 Furthermore, the IEDs were simple enough 
that they could be built and emplaced by people with very little training. Recruiting 
and training an ATO, on the other hand, takes up to seven years – the same time it 
takes to train a doctor.16 Another indication of the magnitude of the disparity may be 
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found by comparing the time required to dispose of an IED with the time required to 
assemble and deploy it. In a chapter titled “The asymmetric war”, Sean Rayment 
describes how he accompanied a bomb-hunting team of 30 men on a route-clearing 
mission and how they needed more than five hours to locate and clear a single IED 
from an old Taliban firing point.17 Typical Afghan IEDs, on the other hand, could be 
assembled in a matter of minutes and were being produced on an industrial scale. 
Rayment mentions several interviews with bomb hunters who told him that the 
technology of the typical Afghan IED was very simple and posed little challenge. 
They regarded sheer numbers as the actual IED threat in Afghanistan – the devices 
were simply being assembled and emplaced faster than the bomb hunters could clear 
them.18 
Table 1. Coalition IED fatalities in Afghanistan, 2001–201319  
Year IED fatalities Total fatalities IED percentage of total 
2001 0 4 0.00 
2002 4 25 16.00 
2003 3 26 11.54 
2004 12 27 44.44 
2005 20 73 27.40 
2006 41 130 31.54 
2007 78 184 42.39 
2008 152 263 57.79 
2009 275 451 60.98 
2010 368 630 58.41 
2011 252 492 51.22 
2012 132 312 42.31 
2013 33 73 45.21 
Total 1370 2690 50.92 
 
It is illuminating to consider the book by Hunter and the one by Rayment 
in the context of the emerging role that IEDs play in contemporary armed conflict. 
One would do well to read the books while keeping in mind the significance that a 
scholar like PW Singer attaches to IED use in the Iraqi and Afghanistan conflicts. 
Singer notes that, before the two conflicts, IED use was limited and without strategic 
consequences. In Iraq and in Afghanistan, however, IED use helped neutralise the 
overwhelming (conventional) military advantage of the US-led coalition. IED use 
attained strategic significance in the Afghan and Iraqi conflicts, since it directly 
affected the course and outcome of the hostilities.20 An indication of IED 
effectiveness can be found in the table below. A weapon system responsible for 
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almost 51 per cent of the casualties suffered by the coalition forces in Afghanistan is 
a strategic one by any measure. 
Reading the personal accounts in Eight lives down, Extreme risk and Bomb 
hunters makes it easy to understand how IEDs were employed with strategic 
consequences. These accounts include numerous references to the psychological, 
tactical and operational effects of IEDs. The personal accounts also illuminate the 
nature of the struggle between the bomb removers and the bomb makers. They 
depict a struggle that may be described as adaptive and co-evolving, with both sides 
innovating in an effort to gain a technical or tactical advantage. 
Hunter’s account clearly shows that he (and his fellow ATOs) encountered 
increasingly sophisticated IEDs, including an advanced anti-armour device that was 
used successfully against a Warrior infantry fighting vehicle (IFV). Hunter 
recognised it as a classic Hezbollah anti-armour, off-route mine that had previously 
been encountered in southern Lebanon only. He took the incident as confirmation of 
intelligence reports that Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) personnel had been sent by Iran 
to train bomb makers in Basra.21 Hunter regarded this discovery as significant, 
remarking: 
This is serious. There have been mutterings about LH and the 
Iranians in Basra for some time now. If they are here, and they’ve 
brought their technology with them, we’re royally f… The 
insurgency has just been taken to the next level.22 
The Hezbollah mine represented a new phase in the conflict, not only 
because it was an effective anti-armour design, but also because the mine belonged 
to an IED specifically designed to vaporise all firing circuit components, thereby 
preventing any forensic analysis by the opposing side. Forensic data play a vital role 
in any CIED effort to trace those who made and planted the bombs.23 The new mine 
meant, amongst other things, that the Sunni and Shia militants in Iraq were reacting 
to Coalition tactics by improving their IED technology. 
Another indication of the co-evolving nature of the struggle between bomb 
removers and bomb makers/planters may be found in Hunter’s description of the 
IED incident on day 20 of his tour. During that incident, the bomb-disposal team’s 
remotely controlled robot (of the “Wheelbarrow” type) froze during its approach of 
the IED because its radio-control mechanism had been inhibited by jamming. The 
Wheelbarrow was the preferred tool for inspecting and disrupting IEDs, since it 
allowed ATOs to perform their tasks without risking life and limb. The inoperable 
Wheelbarrow forced Hunter to approach the IED in person and place a disruptor 
weapon by hand. Hunter concluded that exposing himself had been the bomb 
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planter’s intent all along. After this incident, the ATO and his team preferred 
communicating with the robot by fibre-optic cable. This was the first time that 
Hunter and his team had been subjected to electronic counter-measures (ECM) by 
the insurgents. British bomb-disposal teams had started using both ECM and Wheel-
barrow robots against the IEDs they encountered during the conflict in Northern 
Ireland. Both had met with considerable success during that conflict.24 
It is interesting to compare the contest between bomb removers and bomb 
makers/planters in Afghanistan to the struggle between the same opponents in Iraq. 
An ATO, interviewed by Rayment in Afghanistan, gave an account similar to that 
by Hunter of always being watched closely by the opposition whenever he disarmed 
IEDs. These observers were looking for any procedural vulnerability that could be 
exploited when planting the next IED. The ATO told Rayment:  
It’s infuriating watching them sitting with their backs against a 
compound wall 40-50 metres away, just watching what the operator 
is doing. They will watch what actions I carry out on that device and 
they will try to think of ways to catch me out. They will look at areas 
I may or may not have searched. And you know what they are 
thinking: he didn’t search there – maybe I should place an IED in 
that area. So I have to be very careful all the time, constantly 
changing my drills and making sure I don’t set patterns – it’s 
basically a game of chess with serious consequences for the loser. I 
always have to stay one step ahead.25 
From Rayment’s account, it is clear that the contest between bomb 
removers and bomb planters in Afghanistan differed from the situation in Iraq in at 
least one significant respect. In Iraq, Hunter and his comrades faced opponents who 
adapted and evolved primarily by improving their IED technology. In Afghanistan, 
however, IEDs were typically simple (low-tech) devices, according to Rayment. The 
conflict journalist mentions only one significant technological advance in the IEDs 
employed in Afghanistan – from IEDs with a high metal content to devices with 
little or no metal content. High metal content IEDs were easy to find with the Vallon 
metal detectors used by the British Army. The Vallon, however, could not detect 
IEDs with low or no metal content. Such IEDS were extremely difficult to detect 
and their existence was initially kept secret from the British public.26 
The Taliban, unlike the Shia and Sunni militants in Iraq, did not 
continually improve their IED technology, but instead developed increasingly 
sophisticated IED ambush tactics. Rayment reports that the Taliban had studied 
British tactics to the point where they could accurately predict how British troops 
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would respond when ambushed. They knew, for instance, that the British standard 
operating procedure was to call for helicopter evacuation whenever a soldier was 
seriously wounded. The Taliban also knew what a good helicopter landing site 
(HLS) looked like. This enabled them to mine obvious landing sites close to the 
primary ambush site.27 
Conclusion 
At this point, it should be clear why a serious student of contemporary 
armed conflict would find Eight lives down, Extreme risk and Bomb hunters useful 
reading material. The books should be particularly useful to scholars with a 
professional interest in asymmetric warfare or in the emerging role of IEDs. Some of 
them might even consider it a bonus that the books are entertaining to read. 
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